Robert D. Kaplan's article "The Next Frontier" in the recent issue of The Atlantic Monthly explains how the creation of AFRICOM, "offers the hope of steady, low-key progress in the war on terror." While we have had boots on the ground in the Horn of Africa subordinate to U.S. Central Command since shortly after 9/11, it has always been a third priority behind the warfighting efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This new "combatant command" will give Africa the strategic attention it deserves. Only a tiny fraction part of AFRICOM's efforts will be, as the military says, "kinetic." Its success in denying sanctuary to jihadists will depend heavily on "soft power," including the humanitarian efforts undertaken by nongovernmental organizations.
Kaplan presents much to ponder, but I want to call particular attention to his final paragraph:
"AFRICOM should be a catalyst for greater military cooperation with civilian relief agencies and other nongovernmental organizations. Like it or not, because humanitarian operations are about logistics, quick access, and the establishment of security perimeters, they encompass a strong military element. The boards of directors of some NGOs understand this; it is their young and idealistic volunteers who must get over their inherent distrust of the American military. Indeed, through a combination of small-scale military strikes that do not generate bad publicity and constant involvement on the soft, humanitarian side of military operations, AFRICOM could rebuild the post-Iraq image of the American soldier in the global commons."
You might think Kaplan's observation obvious that "because humanitarian operations are about logistics, quick access, and the establishment of security perimeters, they encompass a strong military element." You would think that after experiencing Somalia, Bosnia, and the Rwandan genocide, not to mention the Sudan, these "idealistic volunteers" would understand that effective humanitarian operations require proper security and that, in many cases that will mean security provided by American forces. But such common sense is too often an uncommon virtue among our younger American humanitarians.
How then do we account for the attitudes of the "young and idealistic volunteers" who have an "inherent distrust of the American military?" Answering that question might be worth some detailed empirical research into the views of young humanitarians, but let me suggest that it has something to do first with idealistically inclined young college-aged students being exposed to a constant drumbeat in American academia denouncing American imperialism or America as the evil global hegemon. Nobody wants to be allied with the "dark side"? To concede that American soldiers might provide an essential service for a humanitarian cause, would call into question the myth of the evil empire.
Secondly, this has something to do with the near disappearance of military and diplomatic history in American universities. An entire generation of scholars and therefore their students simply know nothing about the imperative to use force, at times, for good and honorable purposes, an ignorance that filters down into all levels of education, and to public discourse. Which may explain why the less professionally educated, who get their military and diplomatic history from the History Channel and the A&E network rather than the history guild at elite universities, often have far sounder instincts about such matters?
Third, I suspect that this has something to do with a pacifist or quasi-pacifist mindset of many young people inclined to humanitarian activism. This mindset has gained currency in recent years especially among many young people whose humanitarianism is religiously motivated. Pacifism has been making a comeback in theological circles and thus, for a significant number of these young humanitarians, the use of force is reflexively viewed as inherently evil and never part of the solution. Too many of these young people are predisposed to thinking of injustice and poverty in the world to the failure to address the "root causes," the antidote to which is altruistic humanitarian activism. To concede that the military would, at times, have a necessary role to play in providing basic humanitarian services would create too much "cognitive dissonance" in their pacifist, ideological worldview. It would be to concede that the use of discriminate and proportionate force is often a necessary part of any humanitarian effort.
Which is to say, that the naïve pacifism and idealism of so much of our young crop of humanitarians will have to give way to a more mature understanding of the just use of American force. Their more experienced humanitarian elders would do well to explain how and why both the Marine Corps and the Peace Corps each have legitimate roles to play in the efforts to bring humanitarian relief to Africa. And why both are noble and virtuous pursuits.