[From Religion, Culture, and International Conflict.]

Martin Marty, the dean of American religion historians, remarked several years ago that there is "almost no major news in the world today that does not have a religious dimension or component underlying it." His observations are confirmed by research sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center. In a report commissioned by the Center, Robert Lichter and his colleagues at the Center for Media and Public Affairs conducted a study, "Media Coverage of Religion in America 1969-1998," a random sample of 2,365 stories that appeared from 1969 through 1998 in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, and the ABC, CBS, and NBC newscasts.

One of the results unearthed in this study was that religious news stories have nearly doubled in the mainstream press from the 1980s to the 1990s. However, the researchers also found that there was very little understanding of theology or religious belief in religious news. Only 1 story in 14 mentioned any religious beliefs or doctrines. This figure dropped to 1 in 20 for stories about Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Lichter and his colleagues drew the following conclusion from this study:

In recent years, religious faith and its institutional expression have commanded greater attention in the national media newsrooms that set the tone for their profession. If this intensely personal yet inextricably communal sphere of human experience is to play a great role in the national dialogue, journalists need to be aware of the content and consequences of the narrative they craft. The ephemeral events and deadline pressure that define their profession do not encourage self reflection.

In a column devoted to these same survey results, Gregg Easterbrook, a senior editor at The New Republic, reiterated this claim:

Journalists seemed comfortable discussing the politics and scandals of religion but not what people believe -- though what they believe, and why they decide to believe it, is in many ways the most important issue. Important for individuals, anyway; perhaps still too complicated for the big media.

As religiously grounded moral arguments have become ever more influential factors in the national debate -- particularly reinforced by recent presidential elections and the creation of the faith-based initiative office in the White House -- journalists’ ignorance about theological convictions has often worked to distort the public discourse on important policy issues. Pope John Paul II’s pronouncements on stem-cell research, the constitutional controversies regarding faith-based initiatives, the emerging participation of Muslims in American life -- issues like these require political journalists in print and broadcast media to cover religious contexts that many admit they are ill-equipped to understand. Put differently, these news events reflect subtle theological nuances and deep faith commitments that shape the activities of religious believers in the public square. Inasmuch as a faith tradition is an active or significant participant in the public arena, journalists will need to better understand the theological sources and religious convictions that motivate this political activity. The current national discourse has brought faith and its relationship to public policy to the forefront of our daily news. Since 1999, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, through the generosity of the Pew Charitable Trusts, has hosted six conferences for national journalists to help raise the level of their reporting by increasing their understanding of religion, religious communities, and the religious convictions that inform the political activity of devout believers. This book contains the presentations and conversations that grew out of those conferences.

In chapter 1, Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington notes four major changes in global politics over the past decade: culture has replaced ideology as the source of identity in conflict and collaboration; there has been a resurgence of adherence to traditional religions; there is now a pyramid-shape to the structure of global power, with the single superpower at the top (he describes the existing structure as "uni-multi-polar: one superpower, then six or eight major regional powers, then secondary regional powers, then the rest;)" and, fourthly, the nature of international conflict has changed: there are fewer interstate wars and more communal civil wars. Huntington concludes that in the future it will be necessary for Muslim countries to "develop more efficient, effective means of modernization, and to open their societies to competitive and pluralistic enterprises."

In chapter 2, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman suggests that terrorism is becoming increasingly associated with religion but that this is not a new phenomenon. Religious terrorists have always found it easy to kill people because they are able to dehumanize their victims. Terrorist leaders use religious edicts and sacred texts to seize power and attract followers. He argues that "religious terrorism, worrisomely, seems to make active converts more quickly" and "their path to violence is much shorter, I think, because religion plays a large part." He concludes that "the hard truth is that fighting terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle . . . terrorism is the archetypal shark in the water. It must move forward. It must change constantly to survive." Respondent Jeffrey Goldberg of The New Yorker is cautious about underestimating the power of belief in explaining the actions of someone like Osama bin Laden. He wants to pose a question to Bruce Hoffman by making the following assertion: "We must make ourselves widely feared: the might of America must be brought to bear on the Muslim world. Then they might still hate us, but their fear will be stronger than their hatred and they will leave us alone . . . I’m curious to know what Bruce thinks about this." A lively discussion followed.

In chapter 3, Roy Mottahedeh, professor of Islamic history at Harvard University, gives an overview of Islamic theology and history. Mottahedeh argues that throughout its history Islam has not promoted a unification of religion and government and that a secular sphere has always existed. He says: "there was a de facto secular sphere. People think that in Islam, religion and government are one. Yes, on a hypothetical level; people dreamed that it should be that way. But in reality it wasn’t. Almost from the beginning it was not that way." This began to change in the mid-eighteenth century with the founding of Wahhabism, a rigorous, anti-Sufi system. From this he notes that a succession of rigorist thinkers and people have been followers of Wahhabism, including most notably, Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden "expanded the idea that people could be called non-Muslim and said that entire existing governments in Islamic countries could be declared non-Muslim." Respondent Jay Tolson of U.S. News and World Report argues that a revolution in Islamic countries involving communications and literacy has caused a breaking down of old lines of religious authority and allows young Muslims to learn about Islam on their own. This can lead believers down a more moderate and liberal path or to a more puritanical form of Islam. Tolson highlights both positive and sobering developments in the various evolving understandings of modern Islam and warns that we need to "overcome a certain starry-eyed view about how wonderful all religions are."

In chapter 4, Christopher Hitchens, William Galston, and George Weigel discuss the lead up to America’s then potential war in Iraq. Hitchens mentions four justifications for intervention in Iraq (Saddam’s pursuit of weapons of genocide, his relationship to al Qaeda and other international gangsters, prevention of damage to oil fields, and punishment of perpetrators of genocide). He argues that intervention is not only the right course of action but "after a whole series of blunders, crimes, errors, and betrayals, the United States has evolved into the position where it is on the right side in Iraq." William Galston counters that there are two models for resisting Iraq: one, defense, deterrence, and containment; and two, preemption and prevention. He argues that the second model should not be used towards sovereign states such as Iraq. While acknowledging the potentially dangerous nature of Saddam’s regime, he believes that "Iraq is not now, and for the foreseeable future will not be, a direct threat to the territory and people of the United States." Galston believes very much in having a strong defense policy but the issue "is not whether to resist them but how." The current circumstances, grave as they are, do not justify military action at this time. George Weigel argues that "the just war tradition does not begin -- as many of our religious leaders insist that it does -- with a so-called presumption against violence. It begins with the moral responsibility of legitimate public authority to provide for the security of those for whom it is responsible." Because new weapons technologies have raised new and urgent questions, Weigel wonders whether the classic notion of preventing "aggressions underway" can now be limited, as in the past, to the "classic cross-border attack?" He suggests that it cannot: "the lethal equation of rogue states plus weapons of mass destruction plus ballistic-missile capability or links to terrorist organizations equals aggression underway." He draws out the implications this has on our current discussions and reminds that the just war tradition belongs to those with responsibility to prudently protect the common good -- the public authorities.

In chapter 5, James Turner Johnson gives an overview of the history and content of classical just war theory and contrasts it with the concept of jihad in Islam, especially radical Islam. He summarizes the seven criteria that must be met for a war to be just and traces its roots to the Christian Scriptures, church fathers, and the Roman and Greek traditions. Christopher Hitchens responds by reminding us that decisions about war have to be made much faster now then they did fifty years ago. And oftentimes justifications for going to war come when "we find ourselves arguing about whether to intervene in a war that is already under way. The justifications may only come available to us afterwards."

French scholar Gilles Kepel, a professor of Middle East studies at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris, is widely known on both sides of the Atlantic as one of the world’s leading experts on Islam. In chapter 6 he wonders whether radical Islamists are gaining strength or are on the wane. He argues that they were extremely powerful in the 1970s and 1980s but since the early 1990s major splits became apparent in their ranks. He believes that "focusing on this dynamic of disunity within Islamism helps us to understand how and why the Islamist movement’s most radical elements have turned to terrorism." His essay provides a rich and concise background on what has been transpiring in the Muslim world over the past twenty five years. Because of the disunity and major splits in the Islamist movement, he is cautiously hopeful that this could lead to a new appreciation of democracy among Muslims and cites progress in Turkey as an example. Respondent Jeffrey Goldberg of The New Yorker agrees with much of Kepel’s historical overview but wonders: "is the jihadist strain a perversion, or could it be a legitimate interpretation of early Islamic thought and Islamic history?" Much of the discussion that follows attempts to answer this important question.

In chapter 7, historian Philip Jenkins notes that there are approximately two billion Christians in the world today and most of them are non-white. Christianity is most prominent religion in Africa today and is having a profound effect on the politics of that continent. He says: "by 2050, fully twenty of the world’s twenty-five most heavily populated countries will be either predominantly Christian, predominately Muslim, or a mix of the two." While persecution against Christians is most prevalent today, Jenkins believes that both Islam and Christianity will be in conflict with Hinduism in the future. In the future, he predicts that the most important conflict will be "not between Christianity and Islam, but rather between Christianity and the world’s third-largest religion, Hinduism." David Brooks of the New York Times responds by noting that Pentecostalism is the most successful ideational movement of the present. But he wonders: "if Pentecostalism could go from none to a billion in 150 years, is there some new religious movement out there . . . that might be the next Pentecostalism?" Brooks also laments the ignorance of the educated classes toward religion. They "avoid the entire subject of creedal contradictions between religions" despite the fact that these differences plainly exist. He also argues that secularism is "breaking down as a way of describing the world because events are showing that reality defies secularist categories in hugely important ways." In the future, in light of the religious expansions through out the world that Jenkins describes, Brooks says we must take "into account not only economics and power politics but also people’s genuine beliefs and willingness to act on them."

I would like to thank several colleagues at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Senior editor Carol Griffith, with her usual consummate skill, did a masterful job of both editing the papers and retrieving the most important comments buried within the many pages of transcript. Laura Fabrycky provided invaluable assistance in numerous ways. She handled all the details concerning conference arrangements, did heroic work in transcribing tapes, and always provided thoughtful and timely assistance on matters great and small. The Ethics and Public Policy Center has always been blessed with talented interns; Anna Kaufmann came along at just the right time to render indispensable service. Ian Corbin and Kirsten Hasler, both students at Gordon College, generously gave of their time to proofread the final manuscript.

"Disagreement is a rare achievement," said the great Jesuit scholar John Courtney Murray, "and most of what is called disagreement is simply confusion." You will find considerable disagreement within these pages but we trust many points of clarification. At all of these conferences it was our express purpose to have diverse viewpoints expressed and argued. We trust the reader will find that this purpose was achieved in the discussions preserved in this book.