Peter Salins' book is a labor of love as much as scholarship. The child of immigrants who lived the American Dream, he has watched what he calls the "sinister" development of ethnocentricity on the Left and nativism on the Right combine to threaten the American immigration/assimilation paradigm. Salins, a professor of urban affairs at Hunter College and former editor in chief of the City Journal, describes how the system is supposed to work and did work for generations of immigrants, and decries the assault that would split American society into tribes and bar additional immigration.
Salins' basic argument can be set forth briefly. The American system did not actually require immigrants to jump into the melting pot and abandon their old customs. The nation had a positive and confident view of immigration. It was natural that people would wish to come here, for this was the best country; and it was natural to allow them in, for we needed them to populate our lands and work in our fields and factories. Our culture was superior, and they would see that and adapt to it. The "contract" with immigrants had three elements: immigrants would adopt English, would identify with their new homeland, and would live by the precepts of the Protestant work ethic. This contract created what Salins calls the three unities: cultural (through English), civic (through national identification and pride), and values (through the Protestant ethic). If immigrants accepted the deal, America was fairly relaxed about other cultural matters: "assimilation, American style is not about cultural conformity; it is about national unity." While other nations demanded that the immigrant repudiate his own culture and adhere to the "behaviors and customs of the majority," America has been "much more flexible and accommodating." Immigrants "are free to retain or discard as much or as little of their homeland cultures as they wish without compromising their assimilation."
The ethnic diversity that results has historically not been a problem, because assimilation, American style can tolerate very large amounts of diversity so long as the three-part bargain is kept. The "American Idea"--worship of the Constitution, description of the country along ideological rather than racial or ethnic lines, acceptance that newcomers could become good Americans--made immigration legitimate and gave immigrants a secure place in America's understanding of itself. "Time and again," Salins reports, "Americans learned to accept, socialize with, and eventually marry their immigrant neighbors because the American Idea made it the natural thing to do."
There were always challenges to this system. German and Scandinavian immigrants in the 18th and 19th centuries sometimes pushed for official bilingualism, and the social reformer Carl Schurz is a prime example. The intense concentration of Germans in certain areas gave rise to a nativist reaction. Few were immune, and as early as 1751 Benjamin Franklin complained
Why should the Palatine boors be suffered to swarm into our settlement and by herding together establish their language and manners to the exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of aliens who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them?
According to Salins, though such fears existed the early American attitude was one of "passive assimilation." When much larger waves of immigrants arrived in the late 19th Century, "active assimilation" was adopted in order to assure that immigrants did indeed become Americans. The primary tool was the public school, and the lessons taught there and on public occasions drilled the new arrivals in the importance of Americanism.
Salins' account may be too benign in its description of the American approach, at least in one key way: all of the toleration of cultural differences may have been premised on the belief that these were passing fancies. If the immigrants would continue to speak and dress oddly, their children would assimilate rather more thoroughly. It seems likely that Americans were tolerant of the quaint vestiges of immigration because they were confident of the power of American culture to wipe them out. Salins pays too little attention as well to the impact of intermarriage. While he presents the data (57% of Jews now marrying Christians, 84% of Polish-Americans and 73% of Italian-Americans now marrying outside their ethnic group, 65% of Japanese-Americans marrying non-Japanese), he writes of the "survival of ethnic and religious attachments despite the prevalence of intermarriage" and says that "intermarriage does not eradicate ethnic identities." Most sociologists would differ, at least with respect to the intermarriers' children and grandchildren. Intermarriage is a chain phenomenon, increasing with each generation and eroding ethnic identities to the point where, if not eradicated, they consist of the occasional recipe rather than a serious sense of group membership.
Salins persuasively describes an American system that worked extremely well to assimilate immigrants, and then examines what has gone wrong. He believes that anti-immigration forces are rising in influence precisely because the old assimilationist model is under attack, and natives now wonder if more recent immigrants will really become Americans. Bilingualism in the schools and what he calls "ethnic federalism," the divisive spoils system fueled by affirmative action, are now being pushed by several of America's largest foundations and its liberal elites, by parts of the government, and by large minorities among Blacks and Hispanics and especially leadership elements in those communities. This development, he explains, is terrible both because it undermines our sense of common citizenship, and because it reduces support for immigration.
As Salins says, most recent immigrants are indeed accepting the old "assimilation, American style" contract. Many Hispanics, too, are buying the old deal, and the problem here seems to be what he calls a "vocal and politically influential cadre of activists" who are "working assiduously to counter the natural forces of Hispanic assimilation." But there is more difficulty with the Black community, which is torn --now that the great battles over legal discrimination are won--between "the unexciting work of consolidating the victories of the civil rights revolution--in other words, helping blacks to assimilate" and finding "a new basis for grievance and alienation from mainstream American society." Blacks were for much of American history excluded from the assimilationist paradigm, and now that their inclusion is sought, some in the community and its leadership reject that model entirely. For Salins, this is tragic in itself, and dangerous as well as a precedent that may be attractive among other minority and immigrant groups.
Salins' solutions are entirely logical: end affirmative action and "ethnic federalism," restore the good reputation of assimilation as a feature of American society, use the public schools to promote national unity rather than divisiveness--and welcome more immigrants. The immigration system should be reformed, he writes, so that it does not undermine the American assimilationist model. We should be tougher on illegal immigrants; should admit a large but stable number of people each year and should prevent too many people from one country from coming at one time; should select immigrants essentially on a first-come, first-served basis; and should encourage immigrants to become citizens. This would allow America to be "true to its immigration heritage" but also "assuage nativist fears" that immigration is getting out of hand.
Salins' whole effort here is to defend the American model of high immigration levels accompanied by unforced but almost irresistible assimilation. His anger at the marauders who are attacking the history and practices he prizes is a great strength of the book. This is a sustained argument, not a sociology text, and Salins' love for the American system gives Assimilation, American Style a kind of poignance. If we abandon the assimilation model, he fears, ethnic divisions will grow and embitter American life as they now embitter so many other multi-ethnic societies.
It would seem implicit (though Salins never says it directly) that if the changes he calls for cannot be achieved, he would not be able to defend continued large-scale immigration that might deepen those divisions. Just how we are to conquer the multiculturalists and reclaim the schools, or how to revive the reputation of the very idea of assimilation, is not explained here. But Salins' diagnosis is powerful and persuasive, and surely the first step is the one he takes: to understand how and why the American model worked so well, and how it is now being threatened.
