DR. HILLEL FRADKIN: Good afternoon. I'm very happy to welcome you to another in our series of seminars on Islam and American Democracy. I'm Hillel Fradkin, the President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center and also Director of its program on Islam and American Democracy.

It's my very great pleasure today to have with us Ahmed al-Rahim, who has over the course of the last year become a good friend, and is the second member of the al-Rahim family to appear here. Zainab Al-Suwaij, his wife, was here last spring. And it's really a pleasure to have -- to have had both of you, and maybe we'll do as a husband and wife team sometime.

The purpose of this program is to explore the relationship between American Muslims and American Democracy, both with a view to -- most immediately with a view to the future role of the American Muslin community in the United States. But, also with a view to its impact on the whiter Muslim world and the question of the future relationship of Islam and democracy.

Ahmed was born in Lebanon to an Iraqi family, but was raised in the United States. He is a founding member of the American Islamic Congress, an organization which was formed after September 11th, in the belief that American Muslims should play a leading role in rejecting the Muslim extremism and promoting a democratic future in the Muslim world. And I want to commend him for that founding and for the good work it has done since.

A part of that work has, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, been conducted in Iraq itself with projects on education. And perhaps in the question -- although that's immediately your topic, perhaps in the -- in the question period, people might want to hear about what you've been up to.

He is a Preceptor in Classical Arabic and Language and Literature at Harvard University, and is doing his doctoral dissertation in 13th Century Muslim Theology at Yale University. He's been a frequent contributor to various publications, he's appeared on television. And I guess your most recent publication is Before and After Avicenna.

Please welcome Ahmed al-Rahim.

PROFESSOR AHMED AL-RAHIM: Thank you for those kind words. And I want to thank Dr. Fradkin for the invitation, and also thank Eric Brown for helping me with the details of getting here and for hosting me. Thank you.

Today, I would like to discuss three topics. The first is my experience growing up as an American Muslim. The second is a critical assessment of the current leadership of the American Muslim community. And the third is what the community can and should do to create a new spirit of positive engagement in America and around the world.

I was born in Beirut, Lebanon to an Iraqi family and immigrated to the U.S. in 1978. When I came to the U.S., I very much wanted to be part of the American culture that I had read and heard about in Lebanon. But it was a difficult thing to do because I was in Texas, where someone with the name of Ahmed al-Rahim is not easily accepted.

So I began to look to religion as a form of identity. I read The Autobiography of Malcolm X, which I found very relevant in terms of the question of identity in America. The book inspired me to explore my background, which is Shiite.

My family was a secular Shiite family, not particularly religious in any way. The time was 1979, just after the Islamic revolution of Iran. This was a period of great excitement and pride for a lot of Shiites because, for once, the Shiites were able to assert themselves politically and have their own government. And this was felt deeply, even in Houston, Texas.

I began attending mosque in the hope that somehow I would discover my identity. What I ended up discovering was that the mosque experience was political in nature. I was searching for a historical understanding of my tradition, where I came from, and who I was, but at the mosque I ended up with a profoundly political experience.

In 1989, just after Khomeini's death -- I was 19 at the time -- the mosque had arranged a summer trip for us to go to Iran to commemorate the 40th day of his passing and also celebrate the installation of Ali Khamenei as the new leader of the Islamic Republic. This was considered a youth trip of our mosque in Houston, Texas.

We were taken to Iran, where we attended an inauguration ceremony at the old U.S. Embassy, which had been stormed during the Iranian revolution. There, along with the massive crowd, we repeatedly chanted "Death to America" - as if we were at a rock concert. There was Khamenei up there giving a fiery speech, and there I was, an American citizen, at the U.S. Embassy of all places, chanting "Death to America."

This was what my identity quest at the mosque in Houston had led me to. This was the kind of program that the mosque leaders thought was good for their youth. This was, I have to say, quite troubling.

What does it mean, as an American, to chant "Death to America"? I often hear people dismiss this kind of language - one might better call it hate speech or incitement - as mere rhetoric: "Oh, it doesn't really mean anything." But, what I came to realize - all the more so after the September 11 attacks - was that those words actually mean something. There are some Muslim radicals who are willing to take those words to their logical end, and it can't be just dismissed or willfully ignored.

But for a long time, this kind of hate speech and incitement was promoted by many American Muslim organizations - in public speeches at conferences, at mosques, at rallies outside the White House. And for too long, Muslim American organizations and leaders have been allowed to get away with it. This hate speech against America, against Christians, against Hindus, against Jews - nasty anti-Semitism - has somehow been accommodated, not denounced. I think it has partly been accommodated within the program of multiculturalism, where people fear offending or stigmatizing a minority group. "They have their own way of expressing things," is how some people rationalize Muslim hate speech. "It's just on the level of rhetoric."

But what the September 11 attacks brought home was that we can no longer accept that, especially the American Muslim community. I have to say that I find it very condescending for American Muslim leaders not to be held to the same standard as Christian leaders and Jewish leaders. If a Christian or Jewish leader says anything against Muslims, it becomes a national scandal. That is simply not the case with the American Muslim leadership. I believe it is a priority for the American Muslim community to hold its leadership accountable for what they say and what they fail to condemn.

Meanwhile, we watch with some embarrassment as prominent members of the old guard Muslim leadership are indicted on terror charges, including accepting money from Libya and charities funneling money to Al Qaeda and Hamas. These leaders were able to operate for years without significant scrutiny, but now it seems that the government is beginning to crack down - at least on direct ties to terror states and terror groups. It is a case of chickens coming home to roost.

In general, American Muslim organizations fail to promote the complexity that is Islam. Instead, they put out an image of a pure Islam, that Islam is X or Islam is Y. I often hear leaders arguing defensively that Islam treats women fairly. Of course, the vivid counter examples are numerous, from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan and the American public can no longer accept these claims.

It is sometimes argued that the media perpetuates a monolithic image of Islam, but it is actually Muslim organizations that present this line to the media and the media feeds it right back. Muslim American leaders will say: "Islam stands for X", and then the media will ask: "What is the Islamic position on X?" What I would like to see is a much more nuanced discussion of what Islam is, about the complexity of Islam, about the diversity of Muslim life and attitudes, and in particular about the debates within the Muslim community.

It doesn't make sense to ask: what is the Jewish position on this? Or, what is the Christian position on that? Nobody asks those questions. But all too often we hear: "What is the Islamic position?" We have to move away from this kind of essentialist language and get back to a much more nuanced understanding of Islam and the Muslim world.

A few weeks ago, at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries, the Malaysian Prime Minister addressed dozens of heads of states and called for Muslims to unite against the Jews. What did we hear from American Muslim organizations in this country? Hardly a word of condemnation. (And, of course, the media for the most part chose not to ask what American Muslims had to say in response to Prime Minister Matahir.) American Muslim groups are set up to be watchdogs for intolerance to Muslims, yet they fail to regulate their own community's attitudes or monitor the language coming from significant parts of the Muslim world.

American Muslim organizations have also failed to support genuine human rights in the Muslim world. In fact, human rights violations in the Muslim world - which, sadly, are numerous - only seem to come up when non-Muslims are responsible. In fact, there is a golden opportunity for Muslim organizations to get some of the U.S. government grants to advance liberty and help with education in the Muslim world. But few are seizing the moment to use their freedom in America to help advance freedom in the Muslim world.

Part of the problem is that education in the Muslim world is not on the American Muslim community's agenda. Mosques in America receive these packaged curricula from Saudi Arabia or from Iran, and they implement them here without thinking what kind of implications this has for American Muslim children.

Similarly, the issue of minority rights in the Muslim world is also ignored. American Muslims are a minority. We enjoy a tremendous amount of rights and freedom, which we sometimes have to struggle to preserve. But rather than draw our experience here as a minority to deal with minority rights in the Muslim world, there is only silence in the face of Muslim majority abuses. Who speaks out against the discrimination against the Copts in Egypt? Almost nobody. And when Muslims do, for example the Egyptian human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, they are thrown in jail without any protest from CAIR, from MPAC, from any of these organizations.

We at the American Islamic Congress worked hard to try to get Saad Eddin out of jail and to get him a fair trial. I published an op-ed in the Boston Globe, for instance, challenging our community to stand up for an American Muslim political prisoner (Ibrahim has American citizenship as well). Maybe the campaign had an effect, maybe it didn't. But, I hope it served as a model for how American Muslims can - and need to - be vocal about the human rights in the Muslim world. Our minority experience in this country should be translated in helping minorities in the Muslim world. Whether it is the Christians and animists in Sudan, the Copts in Egypt, or the Berbers in North Africa, right now there is generally silence and inaction.

American Muslims should also prioritize the creation of cultural centers, where American Muslims can go and study about their tradition and history - not primarily in a religious way, but just to explore who they are and where they come from. Go to a mosque to try to find out about Islam, and you will too often be fed Wahhabi material or ideological tracts from the Iranian revolution.

When I was in college, studying philosophy, a leader from the mosque in Houston gave me a book explaining all of Islam in 80 pages. He said: "Take this to you philosophy professor and he will convert." And I responded: "My philosophy professor works on one area of skepticism, and he has read shelves of books on this topic. One pamphlet is not going to change his worldview."

Too often you get this kind of material. It's quite problematic, and it actually doesn't appeal to American Muslims who go through the college system here, who are challenged at school to think critically. For Islam to be abridged in one or two books just doesn't work. Young Muslims need cultural centers to turn to. While I was growing up in Texas, I wanted to find such a place and I couldn't. There is no equivalent to a YMCA or Jewish Community Center.

I would also like to see some sort of chaplaincy program developed. While there is one in America, at the Hartford Seminary, there is really no way for imams to be certified in this country. So imams can come in off the plane from Saudi Arabia, from Egypt, from Iran, and become the head of an American mosque.

In the Houston mosque I attended, the imam came from Iraq. In no time, he was the head of the community and was off organizing support for the Iranian regime and fundraising for groups like Hezbollah. There was no accountability. There was no way of asking: "What are your credentials here? Who are you to come and lead this community and what do you know about the American community?"

In fact, he a follower of Montazeri. Montazeri was supposed to succeed Khomeini, but in 1989 Khomeini no longer wanted him to be his successor. Montazeri's son-in-law had connections to an opposition group and so the father was dismissed. Because the imam of our mosque was connected to Montazeri, he was dismissed immediately too. You see, the funding for the mosque came from the Mostazafan Foundation, which is very closely connected to the Khomeini establishment. Politics in Iran has a direct impact on spiritual leadership at an American mosque.

Again, this has so much to do with funding. Where does the funding for these mosques come from? Mostly from Saudi Arabia, or for Shi'ite mosque, from Iran. It's very difficult for American Muslims to collect enough money to build their own mosques, and so they rely on these institutions. That reliance brings political baggage with it, as mosques become subservient to an entire political program, a very radical political program.

Instead, the American Muslim community needs to be satisfied with smaller mosques they can control, where they determine the leadership rather than have it imposed from the outside, and where the leadership understands the local needs of the community. In fact, in the Houston mosque I attended, they could not even get their act together to start a day care center. They were too busy with politics - in Iran and Lebanon - to organize something as simple as a small day care center.

One idea is to have new American chaplaincy programs for imams positioned at various universities. In this way, Muslim religious leaders can go through the same academic training that Christians and Jews have to go through in terms of Biblical criticism - i.e., Quranic criticism - in terms of historical Jesus - i.e., the historical Mohammad. Imams need to understand that these debates are okay, that there are ambiguities within Islamic history, within the early tradition. And whether you believe them or not, they cannot be ignored. Having that kind of chaplaincy program at an American university would be an enormous breakthrough.

Finally, I want to return to the critical issue of hate speech. Hate speech and incitement by Muslims has been accommodated for far too long by Americans, who are doing our community a disservice by remaining uncritical. And American Muslim organizations have to be much more vocal in condemning this kind of speech, especially from the heart of the Muslim world. Because if we fail to vigorously condemn this kind of discourse, there will be more Muslims who are willing to take chants like "Death to America" to their logical conclusion.

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION

DR. FRADKIN: You have basically one of two things happening. One is that Americans generally take Muslim opinion to be represented by these organizations, which, I mean, you spoke primarily from the point of view of what American -- what Muslims might do to America. I mean, there's also the issue of just how people come in the long term to feel about Muslims -- Americans will come to feel about Muslims if they understand this to be authoritative Islamic view.

The other things is that this is leading to a situation in which a relatively large number of American Muslims are abandoning any formal connection to the American Muslim community, if I understand it correctly. That they're not going to the mosques, they don't want to be associated with these institutions and, therefore, your -- it's in a way dissipating the community rather than strengthening it.

I just wanted to, first of all, to ask whether that's in fact the case. And what -- leaving aside the kind of institutions that you suggested we needed, like Islamic cultural centers and smaller mosques, what sort of things would you -- do you think -- how should the discussion be framed in the American Muslim community in order to attract American Muslims back to the community?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: My impression is that more and more Muslims are not going to mosques, and that few have any formal connection to the national organizations representing the Muslim community. After the September 11 attacks, there is a certain fear that if you contribute money to or join this or that organizations, that it might somehow come back to haunt you -- and likewise with mosques. There is a very real phenomenon of Muslims without mosques in America. Part of it has to do with the messages coming from the mosques, due in part to foreign imams preaching a message that has little relevance to the experience of American Muslims.

As far as convincing American Muslims that there is an alternative political program in America, you have to begin defining Islam and what it is to be a Muslim in very broad terms. Often, community organizations and mosques have a very narrow definition of what it is to be a Muslim, what Islam is, and it often is very political. So, you have to define Islam in the broadest, most inclusive sense. And that would include secular Muslims, Muslims of all racial backgrounds, Shiites, Sunni, Ismailis, etc.

DR. FRADKIN: And I'll just ask one more question. Do you see at -- sort of at the community level, any kind of efforts along these lines just springing up, or do you think they really have to -- they are not occurring and that's because of a lack of leadership?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Right now, with the recent indictments of some leading members of the American Muslim community, American Muslims will probably be very careful about what organizations they join and whether they want to be public in any way. But it is also an opportunity for our community to find new leaders and a new role in American society. It is a time for American Muslims to step up and take back their community and redefine the policies advocated in our name.

DR. FRADKIN: One more question following up on what are -- what's the context for these activities. What you just described is one obviously major feature of recent events. The other, of course, is the war in Iraq. And I was wondering whether you'd say something about what opportunities and what problems there exist given that war, and especially what role the -- a particular part of the community, Iraqi Americans might take in this, or have taken or might take in the future.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: The Iraqi-American community was on the whole quite involved in supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein and end his oppression of the Iraqi people. We also felt that this was a way to bring about change in the Muslim world.

In one sense, the war can be seen as a victory for Iraqi-American lobbying efforts. American Muslim leaders often complain that you cannot achieve anything in Washington because the government is controlled by a Zionist lobby. But in fact, you can do something. Interests, be they "neoconservative" or whatever, sometimes intersect with your own and you can have genuine achievements.

At the same time, American Muslim organizations need to get away from the overwhelming focus on foreign policy and get engaged with domestic policy. We need to hear more about different Muslim community positions on Supreme Court nominees. Other religious groups and communities have strong positions on Supreme Court candidates and other key domestic issues, but it's rare to hear anything from Muslims. We need to be much more engaged in the political process and in civil society here.

MR. LOU MARANO: My name is Lou Marano. I'm a UPI reporter. What's the nature of your organization in terms of memberships, scope, reach, your hopes for the future?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: We have about a thousand members across the country. Our mission is to create an inclusive definition of Islam that includes all American Muslims, to be engaged in the political process without being defensive and apologetic for the extremists, to take a genuine stand against hate speech, and to be self-critical. Being self-critical actually strengthens our position. In fact, if you look at any other minority group that has come to the U.S., it is only through being self-critical and even poking fun at yourself that you really integrate into American society. This is part of what we want to do.

MS. LAURA BLUMENFELD: Laura Blumenfeld with the Washington Post. When you're talking about being more involved in politics, how do you see the upcoming presidential race as an opportunity for Muslim Americans or Arab Americans to get involved? And can you contrast it to 2,000 presidential race? The role of the vote and where you see the community. I know you're saying it's not a monolith, but to the extent that you can talk about it.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: It will be very important to continue the work to rebuild Iraq. Muslim Americans, particularly the Iraqi Americans, need to look at candidates' positions on Iraq. Will they continue the existing programs? If the U.S. cuts and runs, it's going to be a disaster, not only for Iraq, but for the Muslim world as a whole.

Candidates also need to demonstrate that they are not afraid to hold our community and our leadership accountable. I for one think indictments against Muslim community leaders who have supported terrorists is a positive development. These problems and links need to be exposed and countered. I hope the candidates are not afraid to address these issues. And they should know that many Muslim Americans feel this way.

MR. IMA SCHULTZ: Ima Schultz (sp) (inaudible) from the Indian Embassy. You have in your presentation said that there has been considerable rethink among the institutions, Muslim institutions in America, particularly after 9/11. And your organization particularly has been trying to send a message as to what the Muslim Americans and institutions could be doing. My question to you would be how receptive have you found the institutions to what you are telling them to do? And both at the level of --.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: -- American non-Muslim institutions.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. As well as individuals.

And maybe if I could ask another question, given of course over the recent debate about operations in Iraq particularly. There has been statements made that the war in Iraq is to spread freedom, to spread democracy. How do you feel the people in the countries, in Iraq and in the region, how are the people responding to this and how is the leadership in that region responding to these comments and these statements? Are they, you know, in terms of are they looking forward to American leadership or they're doing something themselves? What is your sense?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: The reception has been overwhelming. Especially after the September 11 attacks, there was actually an embrace by non-Muslim Americans of the Muslim community. I worry that many American Muslim organizations were not embracing America in the same way, were not reciprocating that embrace. But, the masses of American Muslims did a lot in reaching out, going to schools, talking about Islam. There were many interfaith events. It was a sort of honeymoon for American Muslims. But individuals can only do so much on the local level and then it sort of stops. So the embrace needs to be institutionalized on the community and national level.

As far as the response to the invasion of Iraq and the idea that this will promote freedom, well, I was in Iraq for two months this summer working on education. I found most Iraqis very conflicted about the U.S. On the one hand, they were happy to have the U.S. there, they were happy to see Saddam gone. And they realize that if the U.S. left, Iraq would fall apart. But they were unhappy with how slow things were going. They felt the U.S. could do things much quicker. Particularly the issue of electricity. They expected a super power could bring in the right technology, but it just didn't happen.

So, as far as the response in Iraq, it's generally for the U.S. to stay until it gets the job done. And in the region, you hear many Islamic leaders, like the Sheikh of Al-Azhar talking about supporting the Iraqi people, claiming: "We are with the Iraqi people at this time."

What does that mean? Nothing. They're not sending anybody to help, they're not supporting the effort in any way. In fact, it seems they would be happy to have the whole thing collapse and explode in America's face. So, I fear the reception in the Arab world hasn't been very good.

MR. ROBERT LEIKEN: Bob Leiken from the Nixon Center.

I've got two questions. You've talked about the average Muslim and you've talked about this structure of this -- these organizations. There was an article in the Washington Post in the Outlook section about a year ago by Peter Skerry, in which -- he's a professor now at the Boston College. And he described a dynamic in which Muslims were feeling oppressed, discriminated against by various U.S. government programs, Justice Department programs such as detention and special registration. And that this -- he reported on an MPAC meeting and he said this was increasing the base of these -- I guess we can't call them radical -- mainstream Islamic organizations.

I wondered -- but your -- you seem to be describing a different process of the average Muslim being alienated from this. So, I'd like to hear about that.

And then the other question I had was, this -- you've mentioned that you're a Shiite. Are these organizations that you describe, you mentioned Saudi money and Iranian money, are they predominantly Sunni or do they -- do the Sunni and the Shiites work together? What goes on in terms of the Sunni and Shiite division with respect to these mainstream or radical Muslim organizations?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I think the average Muslim, if we can call him or her by that name, has retreated. He or she is no longer interested in being part of the community and its main organizations. There is a fear that somehow they will be implicated in whatever indictment is brought against this organizations. It's not to say that the indictments and the detention of Muslims hasn't made some Muslims more active and in some ways more anti-American. But that is a very small, but committed group. The majority of Muslims are afraid to speak up or are afraid to come out.

As for the connection of Shiites and Sunnis: after September 11, the Shiite community in American sort of stood up and said those were Sunnis that did it; not us. Some in fact were embraced by neoconservatives. There were articles and books talking about how the Shiites by nature are more compatible with democracy and also have a minority psychology, which makes them a little bit more accommodating and less aggressive and dominant. But, the fact of the matter is that Shiism and Sunnism both have elements of extremism. We can thank Hezbollah for giving the world suicide bombings. Both these traditions have extremism. Sometimes they work together and sometimes they don't.

Shiites don't really have a major national organization. Most of these groups are Sunni, though they claim to represent Shiites and Muslims in general. Shiites tend not to be as savvy, if you will, in Washington. Shiites tend to focus on local institutions, like mosques and schools that teach Persian. The Imam Al-Khoie Mosque in New York is one of the largest. A lot of the funding comes from Mostazafan Foundation, which is a holdover from the period of the Shah. They basically managed the money for the Iranian government. After 1979, the money was frozen and this organization manages the money, which can only be spent in America. And so it's spent on building mosques and schools.

The problem with it's all tied to politics. Whatever happens in Iran has a direct impact on the community and the children that go to these schools. I gave you the example of the imam at the mosque I attended. When there was a power shift in Iran, he was kicked out of the mosque.

DR. FRADKIN: I just wanted to ask a follow-up on the earlier question about elections and possibly the role of the Iraqi American community. You know, precisely -- I mean, there -- it does seem to be the case that there is this problem that, when people are -- when people ask what is Islam, or what are -- what do American Muslims think, there is supposed to be only one answer.

And of course, it is the case that the American Muslim community is extraordinarily diverse, at least by virtue of its geographic origins. First of all, there's a very substantial part of it that's African-American; roughly 30 percent. Roughly 30 is from South Asia; 20-25 from the Arab world. I guess the question would be, as people approach electoral issues in the United States, whether those differences have any impact, or whether there would be a unified response?

For example, one could imagine that there are certain parts of the American Muslim community -- for whatever reasons, good or bad -- that objected to the war. Whereas, on the other hand, as you said, the Iraqi American community was by and large for the war.

What happens then within the Muslim community? Is there a debate that goes on between these two positions? Or will there be a debate? Will, for example, the Iraqi American communities sort of step forward and say, well, we don't know what you're about, but we're for -- we were for the war and we're for X policy in Iraq. Not necessarily the present policy, but --. Do you think that's likely to happen and, if so, with what effect?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Well, I mean, I think it is happening. I saw a poll taken before the recent Gulf war that said that 60 percent of Arab Americans were for the war. There was a real debate within the Arab community about whether we should do this or not.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: If I could segue off of what he said, because it's very important for my readers and for those (inaudible).

The question generally revolves around (inaudible) Muslims, whether they're Arab or Afghan, whatever. Why do they not speak out? You say the majority of Iraqis are in favor of the conflict in Iraq. Where is the pro-march demonstration? Where is that Iraqi voice?

There are millions of Muslims in this country and yet, post-9/11, there is a lack of empathy from the perception of non-Muslims about what's going in the extremist sections and factions of the Muslim world.

So, where is the -- why is that disconnect there on the one hand. On the other hand, what can be done to draw out these Muslims to speak up, and whether they're Iraqi in favor of the war, or Afghans in favor of the conflict or whatever.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: There were many Iraqis who were outspoken and published a lot of op-eds and gave interviews about the war. There were many programs. Barbara Walters, for instance, interviewed Iraqis who spoke out about Saddam's oppression in Iraq. So, I don't think that was really an issue as far as Iraq goes. Iraqis are pretty outspoken.

About condemning violence in the name of Islam and hate speech, I think there is a fear. A fear of retaliation, a feel of being singled out. I'll give you a concrete example. One of our board members published an op-ed after the September 11 attacks apologizing to America on behalf of American Muslims for what had happened. And apologizing for the reaction of the American Muslim organizations in being more concerned about hate crimes against Muslims than condemning the terror attacks right away. He received many threats, often in the form of hate mail. This threat creates a tremendous fear of speaking out.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: (Inaudible) there needs to be a reformation of Islamic (inaudible).

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: There needs to be --.

DR. FRADKIN: -- I don't -- that doesn't sound like actually -- that's -- that seems to be another issue. But, I mean, I think what Ahmed is saying is that there's specifically the fear of, and presumably the real threat of intimidation by radicals or extremists. That's not -- these are people that are not likely to be talked out of simply their hostility and they do represent a real problem if they are there and if they manage to intimidate people.

I mean, it's certainly understandable that people -- it seems to me that there have been two things operative, at least so far as I can observe. There have been people who have been intimidated. And there -- the question is then, well what -- there's certainly a disincentive to speak. And the question is, what is the incentive to speak? Is there going to be a kind of -- will they find support even within the American Muslim community? Or will they find support within the American community at large, or American society at large? If they receive the latter, there is, of course, a variety of incentives that one can imagine.

But, I think there were some follow-up questions over here. Bob and --.

MR. LEIKEN: You mentioned the multiculturalism and you've also mentioned Saudi money and Iranian money and you describe an almost monolithic structure of radical Islam in this country. Where is it coming from? Is it coming from students who've been radicalized in that direction, in multiculturalism? Is it a result of Saudi money and Wahhabism? Is it a result of -- I mean, one hears about the Afghan refugee service setting up all kinds of organizations in this country connected with -- eventually with Al-Qaeda. I mean, is this coming from the outside or from the inside, or what kind of combination or both has produced this situation?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: It mainly comes from the vacuum that has been left by the collapse of Arab nationalism. Many former Arab Nationalists are now embracing some kind of Islamic nationalism, if you will. It is funded by money from Saudi Arabia, by money from the Gulf. Very well funded. Some organizations backed by Saudi money have taken out full-page ads in the New York Times. That takes serious funding.

DR. FRADKIN: If I could -- I think the question really was, you mentioned multiculturalism earlier. And I took you to mean that a certain multicultural -- multiculturalism as a sort of doctrine among the Americans generally has tended to indulge a certain kind of Islamic radicalism. Is that what you meant?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Yes, that is the dark side of multiculturalism. The accommodating side that says, well, you know, Muslims just kind of speak that way and we can accept it, but we certainly will not accept Christians and Jews speaking that way. Muslim leadership needs to be held to the same standards as any other kind of religious and community leadership in America.

DR. FRADKIN: Yes, right here.

MS. ROBERTA BARUCH: Roberta Baruch from the American Jewish Committee.

Two things. First of all, how much of a factor -- I mean, I would see it as potentially an enormous factor, the amount of money that comes in to American Muslims from Saudi Arabia. You've described them funding mosques and funding schools and, indeed, funding chairs in departments in universities all over the country, which then has to affect the kids on campus.

What kind of effort is there to establish a separate Islamic hierarchy and bureaucracy that's independent of that funding? How feasible is that and how much of an effort is there in that direction now?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: At the moment, it's not very feasible. It is very difficult to compete with these organizations and the kind of money pouring in to support them. Also, there is this sense among American Muslims that they have to compete with the other religious communities. "We have to have the biggest mosque in the country. We have to have the biggest mosque in the city. We have to have the biggest religious institution in this city, bigger than the synagogue, bigger than the church, bigger than the temple."

There is this sense of competition. But the community needs to be content with having small institutions that they are in charge of, that they know that can take care of their needs. Of course, everybody wants to have the biggest house. Everybody wants to have the fanciest car. And that's something promoted culturally here in America. To be satisfied with what you have is a bit difficult.

DR. FRADKIN: There's a question back there.

MR. MIKE MANHALL: Mike Manhall (sp) from the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy. I was confused when you said that you weren't really asking for a reformation in Islam by the chaplaincy program. You advocated for universities. Isn't that essentially (inaudible)?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Well, a reformation is quite complex. It's a historical period. It has its own reasons. I don't think that is possible within Islam right now. It has to start on a much smaller level. We need faculty who are interested in teaching and applying Biblical criticism to the Quran. We need faculty who are willing to look at the issue of the historical Muhammad, what is the basis of ambiguity in our tradition. We need to begin to deal with these things in an academic way.

But, to talk about a reformation for the Muslim world, it's a very big thing, particularly with the types of regimes in the Muslim world today. If somebody writes a work looking at the Quran -- for example Abu Zaid's work applying critical theory to the Quran, he is an Egyptian academic and an interesting scholar whose work wasn't even very radical. But he was forced to divorce his wife and flee to the Netherlands. If someone can't publish a book or an article saying these kinds of things, how is it possible to have reformation?

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: (Inaudible) all of Islam and yet everyone says it's a small part of (inaudible).

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Growing religious extremism is partly because of frustration with the governments in the region, because of the vacuum left by Arab nationalism. It's there because there's lack of information in these countries. If you don't have a free press, if you're not allowed to access information, then you tend to look at things very narrowly. Also, it's popular right now to be a religious Muslim, just as secularism was very popular in the '30s and '40s in the Arab world. If I think about my grandfather's generation, they wanted nothing to do with Islam. Now, it's all about Islam. I think it is a phase that I hope will pass soon.

DR. FRADKIN: I want to put in a couple of words on both the latter issue, but also this question of reformation. It's become common to ask somehow or other whether Islam doesn't need a reformation. And in one sense, it's kind of understandable why it's posed in those terms, it seems to me, because there is a kind of theory of modern democracy that attributes it to the reformation or to the consequences of the reformation.

But, it seems to me there are two -- at least two problems with applying this -- or seeing it in this framework. First of all, Islam has already had several reformations, or at least several movements that understand themselves as being reform movements. Beginning at the very -- at least with the Wahhabi movement, which understood -- which is 250 years old at this point and understood itself to be a reform of Islam, a reform of corrupt Islam, just as in some respects Protestantism understood itself to be a form -- a reform of corrupt Christianity. That's one thing.

The second -- so it's not clear -- and since it's already had several reforms, it's not clear exactly -- you know, it's not a reform it needs. It needs -- if there's a problem, the question is what kind of reform, what kind of reform it would need.

Second, it seems to be neglected in this discussion about reformation that what -- the immediate consequence of the reformation was not American style liberal democracy, but was religious civil wars. And this just gets sort of brushed over or ignored altogether.

I mean, exactly in what way should one look to the Western experience of the Protestant Reformation as providing some kind of guidance to the development of alternatives within Islam? I mean, one could make a very strong argument that it was the civil wars of the 16th and 17th Centuries that led people to try to propose what we -- liberal democracy. And so it's not the reformation itself, it was a kind of reaction to it that -- that was productive of what we tend now to consider desirable.

I mean, and as for the question of extremism, I do think it really needs to be understood and underscored. I agree here with Ahmed that, for at least 30 years now, the only thing that's had any kind of vitality, that has offered any kind of -- seemed to offer any alternative to what is observably a bad situation in the Muslim world, has been Islamic radicalism.

I mean, there's -- the situation around 1970, or even -- and certainly later, has been one in which the Muslim world seems to be in decline, seems to continue to be in decline. Various options have been tried. The latest one was our nationalism or our socialism. But all of those were discredited, at the latest, by 1970.

And well, you know, it's not normal for people to say, well, there's really no future for us, there's no option. They looked around for an option and the only thing that sort of presented itself, and perhaps could present itself, was Islamic radicalism. I mean, it could present itself precisely because the governments of most Muslim countries permitted no alternatives to present themselves. Islamic Radicalism they couldn't quite prevent from presenting itself. And sometimes, as far as that's concerned, they invented it. That was the policy of the Egyptian government during the '70s.

So, there was, you know, it came back to haunt them because the radicals killed the main sponsor of Islamic revival, namely Sadat. But -- hum?

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: (Inaudible).

DR. FRADKIN: No, no. The (inaudible), right.

But, it's -- I mean, I don't think from -- given those factors, I don't think it's so hard to understand why radicalism has been so prominent because it does seem -- it seemed to people to be the only thing going. And in some respects, it was the only thing going.

For the rest, you -- you just have these sclerotic autocratic regimes or worse, something like Saddam, which, you know, thoroughly brutal regimes. And as I said, it's not normal or natural for people to say to themselves, well, this is all there is in life and this is what we have to settle for.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I would add that the one thread through Arab Nationalism and Islamic Revivalism is radicalism. It's there in both traditions, this need for revolution, for sweeping what came before and establishing a new order. This is one of the problems plaguing the Arab world right now. They want to change things. They want change. But, how is that change going to be brought about? It's often talked about using language of revolution.

What's interesting about an individual like Saad Eddin Ibrahim is that he's saying: "I'm willing to work within the system here. Our system is not the greatest, but it can be reformed." This is a new kind of thinking that's just beginning now in the Arab world. The question is whether the governments there will allow that. And in Egypt, it's still a question whether that will happen.

DR. FRADKIN: This one over here and then -- then you --.

MR. EVIAN PATTERSON: Evian Patterson. You just mentioned about Saad Eddin Ibrahim and I had a chance to hear him speak, and where he speaks on the promotion of democracy in the Islamic world or the Arab world. And I asked him what was -- which example should we follow -- should the Islamic world follow, where Egypt is -- they claim to be a democracy. But, in fact, he was imprisoned because of his disagreement with the policies of Egypt.

So, where does the -- what steps should they take? Is there a criticism from the Arab American world about systems like Mubarak in Egypt quasi-democracy?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I think the Muslim American community can play a big role in putting pressure on Egypt. First of all, Egypt receives $2 billion from the U.S. each year. That can be leveraged to put pressure on Egypt to bring about reforms. The Arab-Muslim community needs to play a leading role in doing that, in putting pressure on the U.S. to bring about change in these regions. And in that way, making the government realize that here our Arab citizens are pushing for this so that they feel a little bit better about putting pressure on Egypt. That's one way that it could happen.

DR. FRADKIN: Bob, did you have --?

MR. LEIKEN: (Inaudible). Do we know what percent of Muslims go to mosques or mosque, and -- A. And B, I've read accounts of people who have infiltrated mosques and who speak Arabic and who say that, in many mosques, there'll be one discourse in English and a different, much more radical one in Arabic. Is that generally the case or often the case?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I'm not sure that there are any studies on how many Muslims go to mosque. I mean, I haven't seen any. I don't know if you've seen any around? But --.

DR. FRADKIN: -- I mean, what is generally true, it seems to me, Bob, is that reliable statistics about the American Muslim community are very hard to come by, beginning with how large it is. It's somewhat easier to say, strangely enough, how it divides up in terms of ethnic origin. But, the actual numbers and then mosque attendance I think is really just not known.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Part of the problem is Muslims are afraid to sign a log, you know, when they go to the mosque. To sign their same and say I've been here because they're afraid that these things will be used against them. The fact is that the majority of American Muslims don't go to mosques. Young American Muslims will tell you that the message at the mosque doesn't resonate with them. First of all, the imam often doesn't speak English. The translation is garbled, and the message just doesn't resonate. Sure the double discourse exists in some mosques. I've been to mosques where I've heard one thing said in Arabic and the translation being something else. I don't know how widespread it is, though.

MR. LEIKEN: Do you speak up when you hear (inaudible)?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I have. There was one case where the imam was talking about the end of time when the Muslims will have to kill the Jews and all this. And I said, what's going on here? This is not acceptable.

MR. LEIKEN: What was their response (inaudible)?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: His response was that this is tradition, and you have to accept it.

And that's part of the problem. Islam, like any other religion, has hate speech imbedded in the tradition. Muslims have to come to terms with that. It doesn't makeus worse Muslims. It actually makes us better for coming to terms with it. What comes to mind is how the Lutherans. Have dealt with Martin Luther's anti-Semitism, but at the same time maintained their connection to him. The same sort of thing needs to happen with Islam. And the issue of hate speech needs to be addressed, whether it occurs in the tradition, in a political context, or any other context.

DR. FRADKIN: I think we'll make this the last question.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: (Inaudible) really don't know. Excuse me. What kind of government would you see democracy bringing to Egypt? I mean, if there was one person, one vote, what kind of government would you see coming out of it?

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: Well, one that respects the rights of minorities. If we will have a constitution that protects the rights of minorities. This is the question in Iraq. Will the Shiites dominate or not? If you write the constitution and laws in such a way as to protect the minorities, then there isn't any reason you can't have one person, one vote.

DR. FRADKIN: I think we'll just end on this. But, someone proposed awhile back that, if in fact Iraq has a constitutional convention, that its proceedings be publicly broadcast as a kind of example of the -- you know, a venting of the issues and a venting of what would be reasonable political discourse to the entire world, and perhaps to the Muslim world generally.

PROFESSOR AL-RAHIM: I think Iraq could play a big role in coming up with a sort of alternative to Al-Jazeera. In the sense that Iraqis need to begin telling their stories about what it was like to live under Saddam, what they experienced. In that way, they can open up a whole debate in the Arab world, in the Muslim world, about living under these kinds of governments. And I think that will happen. There are many producers and people interested in doing these kinds of stories.

DR. FRADKIN: Join me in thanking Ahmed.